Close Protection Officers Don’t Forget The Security Back Door!

Written by: Mark Yates The British American Security Expert

As close protection consultants we feel it important to pass on relevant security information to all aspiring bodyguards and operational close protection officers.

Editors Note: This Close Protection Officers Don’t Forget The Security Back Door article was first published in the Bodyguard magazine when Mark D. Yates the British American Security Expert was the magazine editor. We have the kind permission of Mark and his close friend Norman Jennings to reprint it.

The bombing of the American Embassies in Africa, August of 1998, has caused an increase and awareness of terrorist action once again. With these bombings, a ripple effect has been created in the business world especially for corporate travellers. There is a definite requirement to upgrade their security systems and close protection services.

Each business or individual will be placing more impressive security and close protection equipment, or implementing some forms of stricter visual security. Such as better closed circuit video cameras, picture identification cards, more personal security etc in their residence and or business’s. Thereby, hardening themselves as targets, to any threats to them or to their business and closing or controlling access through their front entrance of their residence and business. However, the same impetus is not placed on the backside of their residence and business. These entrances (herein called the Security Back Door) are where most of their servants and suppliers will come through on a daily basis with equipment, packages food, shipping and receiving etc.

If there is a cafeteria inside a business building complex and on the ground floor, or located in the basement of the building. After an individual has come through the main front entrance of the building. He or she is usually within 15-20 feet of a security guard checkpoint. That check point does not stop anyone from going into the cafeteria. The security or close protection guard is guarding entrances to the building elevators and stairs within the building were the entire employee, visitors, vendors may have to pass through to go to their workspace, other offices, supply room’s etc. This type of security arrangement can allow an intruder to enter into a building via the cafeteria to cause damage, death or injury.

While commissioner for the Republic of the Marshall Islands National Police (herein RMINP). You would think that by having only two means of entering onto the Islands (commercial Airplane and Ships) that we would have easier control of individuals and equipment? Wrong! It was a nightmare to security control.

RMINP back doors were via private aircraft’s and boats that were unscheduled unlike your commercial air and shipping lines. These planes and boats would arrive at any time, day or night, and were not met by any Republic of the Marshall Islands Customs agents. Private boats would go to the local Marina to dock. Thereby, by passing the Republics customs agents. Because the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Harbour Master was the person responsible for meeting all arriving private boats, collecting a docking fee and logging them in a master log book for all arriving boats. It was much the same for the airport, except it was the duty airport security manager (if he was there) to log in visiting aircraft.

Also, in the harbour and closer to the commercial shipping docks, was a fishing canary for Tuna boats. This was another backdoor for RMINP as the Republic would have Russian, Chinese, American, Japanese, Indonesian and other countries fishing boats, that would arrive for ice, fuel, supplies or to off- load tuna to be shipped via commercial airlines to the United States and elsewhere.

Although it was the responsibility of the Republic Customs to inspect each of these boats it was seldom done. Ultimately security was poor. Fortunately, the National Police Maritime Division had the authority to cover this area and to enforce the necessary laws, regulations and security. However, to give you an idea of some of the problems the RMINP had, the Republic would go from having no fishing boats, to having two or three arrivals or ten, twenty or thirty or more fishing boats arriving at the same time. The Chinese fishing boat crews average ten to fifteen people per boat. Other countries’ boats, depending on the size of the boat, would be twenty-five to fifty and in some cases a hundred or more crew members. These boats were under an International Fishing Treaty with the Republic of the Marshall Islands. You are smart enough to be able to think of the different security problems the Republic could have with the individual crew members once they came ashore.

Another back door for the RMINP was letter mail and package mail that came into the Republic via scheduled commercial airlines. Bulk mail (3rd class) came via scheduled container ships. Republic of the Marshall Islands Customs were to have a Republic of the Marshall Island Postal Inspector to meet and inspect these arrivals. Again, this seldom occurred and when the mail arrived it was taken directly to the post office. Once at the post office, the mail or packages were placed in individuals or government mailboxes. You can see how easy it would be to get unsafe or illegal items, and/or package bombs to someone due to this lack of security.

Take this one step further via a private boat that arrives and is cleared by the Harbour Master or which may not even be met by anyone from the Republic government. After a few hours or days someone from that private boat could go to the Republic Post Office and mail a bombing device to someone within the Republic or to a Republic Government Official. Understandably this created many potential security problems for our close protection team officers. Or they mail a package/letter bomb to a person in another country. Upon their return to their boat, they depart the islands, nothing unusual about a private boat coming in for supplies or fuel and leaving within a matter of a few hours or days.

The RMINP had implemented business and governmental departments: information sheet, inspection programs, on call for discussions etc. However, the weakness of these types of programs is the individuals who do not comply or assist with security procedures, or who do not ask for assistance.

Another back door for RMINP was visitors to the Republic. Visitors would enter the Republic for business meetings and then become tourists for a few hours each day or for a few days before departing. We had other individuals arrive as tourists; all of these individuals would wander around all over the place under the pretext of sightseeing. Even to walking onto the compound of the Republic of the Marshall Island, Presidential residence. This created all kinds of security related problems for our close protection officers. Once on the President’s compound even by mistake, the individual(s) would be arrested by the National Police who were there providing close protection and security services for the President’s residence twenty-four hours, three hundred and sixty five days. The question the RMINP had to ask themselves; “is this individual really what he or she says they are”, “what has he or she surveyed”, have they taken any pictures and why? The reality of someone conducting inside surveillance on the President was a major concern for our close protection officers. This brought home the reality of close protection officers don’t forget the security back door.

Fortunately for the Republic, the threat from terrorists was very low. But that’s not to say it could not change at any time. The requirement for RMINP and you the professional bodyguard or close protection officer is the same ‘be aware and alert of terrorists at all times’. As it was not difficult to access our small Island, it is not difficult to access your area. Think of the many different ways you may have security problems in your area, or your country with trains, bus’s large truck fleets, and other forms of transportation.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands only had 2,300 vehicles, which included only one motorcycle and no buses. The population was fifty-six thousand. Multiply your Seaports, Boat Marinas, Airports and auxiliary landing areas. Immigrants, visitors, tourist etc. Now bring all this and any other security situations you can think of, down to your building complex and/or residence, and you start to realise the extent of your security problem.

As the commissioner, I had the power and authority to recommend, suggest, or implement certain procedures including all aspects of personal security and close protection. However, I also had to have many meetings with the President of the Republic, Ministers, Senators, Government committees, community Business Leaders, Church Officials, Public meetings and Republic government agencies to get any legislation passed. I was very conscious of close protection officers don’t forget the security back door. Many Republic laws were in place and only had to be enforced. However, in most areas “good common sense only had to be followed for good security”. You will be able to do the same for your security close protection assignments.

There is more that can be told and in future bodyguard and security articles. For now Dr. Mark D. Yates and I hope that this article reminds you that close protection officers don’t forget the security back door. The same way you look at your front entrance for security to prevent death, damage or injury to those you are entrusted to safeguard.

As professional bodyguards and close protection officers we move in elite circles. I hope the information contained in this article goes some way to improving your close protection security awareness. Norman Jennings. Former Commissioner Republic of the Marshall Islands

Footnote from Dr. Mark D. Yates, the British American Security Expert:

In relation to close protection officers don’t forget the security back door I thinks Norman’s article hits the spot. All too often I have witnessed security close protection operations go badly wrong because the close protection team has failed to maintain strict access control systems on the back door. I suggest every bodyguard who is an active member of a close protection team should frequently visit the www.closeprotectiongz.com web site Blog, forum and case study files as these outlets offer a valuable and informative insight into the real world of close protection operations.

I also suggest you visit the close protection link on the web site and click on the bodyguard association membership because if you aren’t a member of the law enforcement and bodyguard association international LEBAI then you are not really a Serious Participant within the close protection industry.

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